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THE NEW DISCOVERY DOCTRINE: SOME THOUGHTS ON
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
Rebecca M Bratspies"

The recent commercial success of products developed with resort to the
knowledge of traditional cultures, such as hoodia,' has convinced many that
biological resources, particularly when accompanied by traditional knowledge
about how to exploit these resources, will be a new gold mine in the twentyfirst century.2 Like all gold rushes, the scramble to capture and exploit
biological resources and the traditional knowledge about their use has
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Special thanks to the participants of the 2006 Idaho Symposium Indigenous Peoples Under
International Law, and to the participants of the 2006 University of Ottawa Right to Food at the
Nexus of Trade and Technology Symposium for providing valuable feedback on this project,
to Caitlin Borgman, Julie Goldscheid, Sid Harring, Penelope Andrews and Russell Miller for
reading drafts of this essay, to Shalini Deo for her able research assistance, to Naomi Florence
Schulz for her endless cooperation, and to Dr. Holger P. Hestermeyer.
1. Hoodia is a cactus that is native to the South African Kalahari Desert. For centuries,
the hunter-gatherer San people relied on its appetite suppressant qualities to minimize hunger
and thirst during long Kalahari hunting expeditions. Based on this traditional use, a South
African quasi-governmental scientific organization began researching the unique properties of
Hoodia. Their animal studies suggested that Hoodia induced rapid weight loss without any
apparent negative side effects. After patenting the biologically active molecule, the South
African researchers sold the rights to Hoodia to a biotech company. Ultimately Pfizer
purchased the rights for $21 million. The San peoples were completely unaware of these
events, and received no benefit from this exploitation of their traditional knowledge. The CEO
of the biotech company claimed that the South African scientists had led him to believe that "the
tribes which used the Hoodia cactus were extinct." Antony Barnett, In Africa the Hoodia
Cactus Keeps Men Alive: Now Its Secret Is 'Stolen'toMake Us Thin, THE GUARDIAN, June 17,
2001, availableathttp://education.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4205467-102275,oo.html. After
an international outcry, a modest benefit-sharing program was arranged on behalf of the San
people. See San Rights Vis--Vis the Hoodia Succulent, WIMSA ANNUAL REPORT ON
ACTIVITIES 2002/03 (2003), http://www.san.org.za/wimsa/ar2002_3/annualrep l O.htm. However, the San have lost the opportunity to profit from exploiting this knowledge, or even to
decide whether and how to share their traditional knowledge with the world.
2. Robert Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPS: The PharmaceuticalIndustry Drive to
Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives
Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069 (1996); see also U.N.
CTR. ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPS. [UNCTC], INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT at 23-29, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/24, U.N. Sales No. E.93.II.A.10
(1993) (discussing the impact of intellectual property rights on foreign direct investment).
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attracted its share of prospectors, hucksters and thieves. And, like all gold
rushes, this one has raised fundamental questions about ownership of these
newly-discovered, or newly-valued resources. Attempts to answer such
questions have generated a vast literature about biopiracy and traditional
knowledge. 4
The discourse surrounding traditional knowledge takes place on a number
of levels simultaneously. Trade advocates view ownership of traditional
knowledge and biological diversity through the lens of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements. Environmentalists approach the question
with ecosystem preservation in mind. Because most of the world's remaining
biodiversity' exists within the territories of indigenous peoples, issues of
sovereignty, identity, colonialism, and exploitation inevitably swirl beneath
the surface of the discussions.6 And, of course, all these dialogues occur
against a backdrop of a globalizing market economy that values resources
almost exclusively in terms of their monetary value.
So far, the dynamic seems to be a tug of war between two alternative

3. Examples of these fundamental questions are: Are the biological resources in question
already owned, or even ownable? If they are already owned, who owns them? If they are
ownable, how does one acquire ownership? What are the consequences if the resources are not
ownable at all? These same questions are central to the related, though different set of issues
surrounding the patenting of genetic sequences. See Dorothy Nelkin, A BriefHistory of the
Political Work of Genetics, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 121, 127 (2002) (situating attempts by NIH to
patent genetic sequences isolated from indigenous groups in a history of eugenics research);
Margaret Lock, Genetic Diversity and the Politics of Difference, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 83
(1999); Gary Taubes, Scientists Attacked for 'Patenting'Pacific Tribe, 270 SCIENCE 1112
(1995). The United States has been at the forefront of extending patent protection to a wide
array of genetic material isolated from humans and other living organisms. Eric B. Chen, Who
Owns the Property Rights to Your Genetic Material?, 13 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 2
(2004) (discussing recent state and federal judicial patterns concerning the granting of property
rights in human tissue).
4. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric ofBiopiracy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
519 (2003).
5. Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) defines biodiversity as "the
variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and
other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes
diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems." Convention on Biological
Diversity, art. 2, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter CBD].
6. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, How Do You Patent a Landscape? The Perils of
Dichotomizing Cultural and Intellectual Property, 8 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 14 (1999)
(discussing the close relationship between indigenous knowledge and the landscapes in which
they arose and terming the insistence on isolatable property rights to be "cognitive

imperialism").
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property visions: state ownership of biological resources, as articulated in
Article 8j of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),7 and private
ownership of these resources under the WTO's Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement.8 There is, however, a third aspect
to this struggle over traditional knowledge and biological resources. Most of
the world's remaining biodiversity exists within indigenous lands and
territories. Rather than as an aspect of state sovereignty over territory, or the
fruits of private invention, indigenous leaders conceive of these resources as
an aspect of self-determination - as a recognition of their fundamental rights
to property and culture.9 Indigenous groups are thus trying to expand the
discourse over biological resources so that it includes their interests and their
hopes for wresting back control over their territories, resources and heritage.' °
This effort is critical because while the tug of war may currently be
between TRIPS and CBD over whether to assign ownership of these
resources to individuals or states, both of these regimes potentially conflict
with indigenous claims and aspirations to group ownership of these same

7. CBD, supra note 5, at 826.
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81, 84 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS].
9. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Preliminary Report: Protection of the Heritage of
Indigenous Peoples,Annex 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/31 (July 8, 1994) (preparedby
Erica-Irene Daes); id. 11-12 (combining cultural and intellectual property of indigenous
peoples under the term "heritage"); S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2d ed. 2004); see also Barsh, supra note 6, at 20 (asserting that "land rights and
knowledge are so closely intertwined" and that attempts to separate them are "a peculiarly
Western reductionism, which views the right to use land as separable from knowledge of how
to use land properly").
10. See, e.g., Int'l Alliance of the Indigenous & Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests,
Charter of the Indigenous Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forest (Feb. 15, 1992) (revised Nov.
22, 2002), available at http://www.intemational-alliance.org/documents/chartereng.doc;
Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism, Kari-Oca Declaration (May 30, 1992),
available at http://www.ipcb.org/resolutions/htmls/karioca.html; ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on
Prevention ofDiscrimination & Prot. ofMinorities, Working Group on Indigenous Populations,
MataatuaDeclarationon CulturalandIntellectualPropertyRights ofIndigenousPeoples,U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1993/CRP.5 (1993) (adopted at the First International Conference
on the Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Whakatane, N.Z.);
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biological materials." To date, their success has been muted. Indigenous
peoples find themselves in direct conflict not only with states but also with
multinational corporations all vying for control over traditional
knowledge, land and resources." As has happened throughout history,
aboriginal peoples are too often finding themselves on the losing end of this
struggle over ownership and access to resources.
Given the resources that have been devoted to developing comprehensive
laws to ensure protection of intellectual property one might ask why the
current legal system does so little to safeguard the cultural and intellectual
property interests of indigenous groups. This failure is perhaps even more
striking in light of the bedrock principle in international law that the right to
own property is a fundamental human right. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 3 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 4
Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 5 and the American

Thammasat Resolution (Dec. 5, 1997), reprintedin SYNTHESIS/REGENERATION, Summer 1998,
http://www.greens.org/s-r/16/16-13.html ("Our rights are inalienable; they existed long before
IPR regimes were established. As legal, political, economic, social and cultural rights, they are
part of peoples' sovereignty and therefore part of human rights."); see also DARRELL A. POSEY
& GRAHAM DUTFIELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ToWARD TRADITIONAL RESOURCE
RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 112 (1996). This is not to
suggest that "indigenous peoples" are some kind of monolith. There are certainly individuals
and groups within that community who are eager to commodify and exploit traditional
knowledge. This discussion of the property issues surrounding the exploitation of traditional
knowledge does not depend on the issue being of universal concern within the affected
communities.
11. See generally ANAYA, supra note 9.
12. See, e.g., Arthur Manuel & Nicole Schabus, Indigenous Peoples at the Margin of the
Global Economy: A Violation ofInternationalHuman Rights andInternationalTrade Law, 8
CHAP. L. REv. 229 (2005) (making this argument in the context of Canada's Affiliated Tribes
and softwood lumber).
13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 74, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/8 10 (Dec. 12, 1948) (declaring that "everyone has the right to own
property" and "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property"), availableat http://www.
un.org/Overview/rights.html.
14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), art. 1(2),
U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/ccpr.pdf [hereinafter ICCPR] (declaring that all peoples
have the right to fully and freely utilize their natural wealth and resources as they deem
appropriate regardless of any international economic agreements).
15. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 ("Every natural or legal person is entitled
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.").
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Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 16 all recognize the right to
property as fundamental.
When the interests and assets of an entire group are, by definition, not
embraced within the protective mantle we call property, it ought to prompt
exploration of some hard questions. 7 First and foremost, one must explore
more fully the international community's proclamation that the right to own
property is a fundamental human right. More specifically, one must ask what
we mean by "property." To what exactly does one have this human right?
Whose definition should or will be used to mark the contours of property?
The international community needs to rethink the very idea of property which people should be entitled to claim what sorts of rights over things and
under what conditions? Although this essay takes up those questions, it
cannot begin to answer them all with any kind of rigor. Instead, by laying out
the dimensions of a few of those questions, this essay is intended to spark a
new dialogue on the meaning of property. In particular, I hope it will provoke
a rethinking of how a bounded vision of the right to property has stymied the
development of a full-fledged right to culture, and has trapped indigenous
peoples in a seemingly unending cycle of dispossession and exploitation.
Part I of this essay provides a brief background on the conflict over
traditional knowledge. Part II details aboriginal aspirations for ownership of
these resources and situates those aspirations in the broader context of TRIPS
and the Convention on Biodiversity. Part III explores the relationship between
traditional knowledge and patent protection. Part IV draws some parallels
between contemporary debates over whether traditional knowledge should be
protected by intellectual property regimes and historical debates over
aboriginal land rights.
I. Some Background
Most of the earth's remaining biodiversity is located in the global south.
The region's countless varieties of plants and trees are viewed as a treasure
trove of genetic matcrial with innumerable potential applications. More

16. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, art. XXIII
(1948), OEA/Ser.LN/I.4Rev. (affirming the right ofevery person to "own such private property
as meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual
and of the home").
17. Scholars are beginning to explore this point. See, e.g., Malla Pollack, Towards a
Feminist Theory of the Public Domain, or Rejecting the Gendered Scope of United States
Copyrightableand PatentableSubject Matter, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 603 (2006)
(asserting that the public domain is inherently feminist).
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importantly, these resources are perceived as unexplored and unowned - a
vast commons of potential riches awaiting claimants. Never mind that these
resources are already in use, or that their value hinges, at least in part, upon
that use.
One easy way to identify a useful compound is to begin by tapping into the
work of local communities that have long studied and experimented to
uncover the medicinal, agricultural and scientific properties of these
resources.
The "discovered" compound can then be patented by the researchers, enabling
them to exploit the biological resource for a profit and to exclude others from
freely accessing and exploiting their proprietary resource. Once issued, the
patent essentially acts as a toll on commerce, one that may make its holder
wealthy. The community that developed the know-how, by contrast, owns
nothing and receives nothing. Its technology and knowledge are the public
domain.
This situation should sound familiar. Once again, outsiders are coming
into traditional communities and their territories in search of gold (this time
metaphorical rather than literal) with little or no regard for those who
currently possess and use that gold. The imbalances inherent in that equation
have not gone unnoticed. Indeed, many have observed that the rush to exploit
biological resources strongly resembles the extravagant claims of ownership
made by outsiders coming to the "new world" during the Age of Discovery.'
Most legal regimes award the mantle of "property," with its attendant
rights, only to the tangible goods produced by indigenous cultures, paying no
attention to the contexts in which those goods were produced and used. 9 As
a result, these legal regimes too often try to force indigenous resources into
property definitions external to the cultures themselves."0 In this process,
18. See infra Part V.
19. See Barsh, supra note 6. By contrast, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights suggests a broader vision that includes all aspects of a group's history, works, traditions,
practices and knowledge within the sphere of protection. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 26
(providing that persons belonging to "ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities... shall not be
denied the right, in community, with other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture....").
20. See, e.g., Michael Blakeney, Communal Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous
Peoples in CulturalExpressions, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 985, 986 (1998) (noting that a
major flaw of the existing international regimes is the refusal to permit indigenous communities
to claim and enforce communal intellectual property rights); Michael Blakeney, Intellectual
Property in Dreamtime: Protecting the Cultural Creativity of Indigenous Peoples (Oxford
Intellectual Prop. Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 11/99, 1999), available at http://www.
oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWPI 199.html.
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indigenous cultures wind up compartmentalized, with artifacts entitled to
legal protection as "cultural property,"'" but with the real wealth of
indigenous peoples - their traditional knowledge about biodiversity, their
folklore, designs and traditions - left outside this mantle of protection. This
compartmentalization has been the subject of stringent criticism as an
inappropriate attempt to sandwich non-Western cultures into a western
Cartesian worldview.22 The role that it plays in facilitating a transfer of
wealth from indigenous cultures to multi-national corporations and nonindigenous researchers has been the subject of less attention.
11. Indigenous Aspirations
For indigenous groups, ownership of their traditional knowledge is
inextricably linked with issues of sovereignty and cultural survival.23 This
linkage is slowly filtering into the mainstream international discourse. For
example, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore has worked very hard to
develop intellectual property policies capable of responding to indigenous
aspirations. Similarly, the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous

21. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231,234, 10 I.L.M.
289; Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990,25 U.S.C. § 3001 (3)(D)
(2000).
22. For this reason, many believe that "heritage" is a better, more inclusive term. Heritage
has alternatively been defined to include "all expressions of the relationship between the people,
their land and the other living beings and spirits which share the land, and is the basis for
maintaining social, economic and diplomatic relationships-through sharing-with other peoples"
or "all objects, sites and knowledge the nature or use of which has been transmitted from
generation to generation, and which is regarded as pertaining to a particular people or its
territory." ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Study
on the Protection ofthe Cultural and Intellectual Property ofIndigenous Peoples, 1 164, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28, (July 28, 1993) (prepared by Erica-Irene Daes) [hereinafter
ECOSOC, Study on the Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous
Peoples); ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on the Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities,
Final Report on the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People
11, U.N.Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (June 21, 1995) (prepared by Erica-Irene Daes); see also Barsh, supra
note 6. A full discussion of this definitional issue is beyond the scope of this essay, it is enough
to note this wider discussion as a backdrop for the exploration of how international law treats
traditional knowledge about biological resources.
23. See, e.g., ANAYA, supra note 9.
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Peoples" not only expressly recognizes that indigenous peoples have a right
to "the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, . .
technologies and... cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property, 25
but it also indicates that rights to indigenous knowledge, innovations, and
practices (referred to as "cultural and intellectual property") cannot be
discussed in isolation from indigenous peoples' rights to their territories and
resources.26 The Draft Declaration specifically recognizes the "distinctive
spiritual and material relationship" of indigenous peoples with their lands and
territories.27 Similarly, the 1989 amendments to the International Labour
Organisation's (ILO) Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries recognized the special relationship
of indigenous cultures and peoples with the land and territories.2a Convention
importance of traditional lands to indigenous
169 also recognized the central
29
cultures and spiritual values.
Unfortunately, the Draft Declaration has yet to be adopted,3" and few
countries have ratified ILO Convention 169.31 In short, these measures are
only a beginning. They have yet to displace or even profoundly influence the
two major international law paradigms, those stemming from TRIPS and from
the CBD. Thus, it is worth looking at each regime in turn.

24. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities,
TechnicalReview of the DraftDeclarationon the Rights ofindigenous Peoples,Addition, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add. I (Apr. 20, 1994).
25. Id.art. 12.
26. Id.arts. 25, 29.
27. Id.art. 25.
28. International Labour Organisation [ILO], Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, arts. 13-14, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382
(entered into force Sept. 5, 1991).
29. Id. art. 13(1).
30. On July 29, 2006, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted the Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and recommended its adoption by the General Assembly.
H.R.C. Res. 2006/2, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1/L.10 (June 30, 2006).
The vote was thirty in favor, two opposed (Canada and the Russian Federation) with twelve
abstentions. Id. In December 2006, however, the General Assembly deferred adoption of the
Draft Declaration to "allow more time for further consultation." Press Release, U.N. Gen.
Assembly, Concluding Consideration of Third Committee Reports, General Assembly Adopts
Convention on Enforced Disappearance, U.N. Doc GA/10563 (Dec. 20, 2006), availableat
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/ga10563.doc.htm.
31. Currently only seventeen countries have ratified ILO Convention 169. International
Labour Organisation, ILOLEX: Conventions, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp.htm
(last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
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A. Private Ownership of Resources Under TRIPS
The WTO's TRIPS agreement, which has been described as a regime of
"hyperownership," 32 radically reshaped intellectual property law, especially
with regard to genetic resources and biodiversity. Prior to the 1994 adoption
of TRIPS as part of the Uruguay Round of the GATT multilateral trade
negotiations, intellectual property was not covered by the GATT agreement.
Instead, each country had its own national intellectual property laws, with a
few international conventions like the Berne Convention 33 and the
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants3 4 (UPOV)

serving as a common backdrop. Traditionally, intellectual property was a
domestic, rather than an international issue; states were free to set their own
level of protection based on their particular circumstances. TRIPS changed
all that by establishing universal and uniform standards for intellectual
property law.
To generalize, the United States, 35 the European Union 36 and Japan37 had
expansive intellectual property regimes that provided strong protections to
individual inventors for a broad array of inventions. Developing countries,
by contrast, granted fewer protections to a more narrow class of inventions,
and many refused to recognize intellectual property claims to medicines,
foods and other essential items. India, for example did not permit patenting
of pharmaceuticals or living organisms. 38 TRIPS, by contrast, imposed a
32. Sabrina Saflin, Hyperownership in a Time of Biotechnological Promise: The
InternationalConflict to Control the Building Blocks of Life, 98 AM. J.INT'L L. 641, 641
(2004).
33. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828
U.N.T.S. 221, (amended Sept. 28, 1979), availableathttp://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/beme/
pdf/trtdocswoOO 1.pdf.
34. International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, http://www.upov.
int/en/publications/conventions/1991/act 199l.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
35. Even under the TRIPS Agreement, United States law continues to permit the imposition
of sanctions against countries that in its unilateral view deny "provision of adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights notwithstanding the fact that the foreign
country may be in compliance with the specific obligations of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights." 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(d)(3)(B)(i)(II) (2000).
36. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 13
I.L.M 268.
37. Patent Law No. 121 (filed Apr. 1959), amended by Law No. 102 (Oct. 2005) (Japan).
38. Averie K. Hason & Jean E. Shimotake, Global Interdependenceand International
CommercialLaw: Recent Developments in Patent Rights for Pharmaceuticalsin China and
India, 18 PACE INT'L L. REv. 303,309 (2006); see also Theresa Beeby Lewis, PatentProtection
for the PharmaceuticalIndustry: A Survey of the PatentLaws of Various Countries, 30 INT'L
LAW. 835, 858-59 (1996).
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one-size-fits-all approach that created mandatory minimum standards
regardless of the state's domestic situation.
Indeed, TRIPS was intended to standardize these differences in intellectual
property protection between the nations of the global north and the global
south. Because the United States, the European Union, and, to a lesser extent,
Japan wield tremendous influence in the WTO, their voices drew the most
attention in the process of drafting the TRIPS agreement. These nations were,
in turn, influenced by the commercial interests of their corporate citizens. In
fact, the TRIPS agreement was drafted and introduced in the Uruguay Round
of GATT by an American industry coalition, the Intellectual Property
Committee (IPC), which conducted what it called "missionary work" to sell
the idea to the international community. James Enyart, Monsanto's Director
of International Affairs at that time, is credited as having described this
strategy as
absolutely unprecedented in GATT. Industry has identified a
major problem for international trade. It crafted a solution,
reduced it to a concrete proposal and sold it to our own and other
goverments .... The industries and traders of world commerce
have played simultaneously the role of patients, the diagnosticians
and the prescribing physicians.39
The WTO negotiations succeeded in reshaping international trade because
the process bundled previously unrelated areas into a single take-it-or-leave-it
package. To participate in the global economy, states had to agree to abide
by all the agreements that make up the WTO. Among the mass of terms were
new intellectual property standards. By linking specified levels of intellectual
property protection to previously unrelated trade issues, such as labor and
39. Vandana Shiva, The Real Reasonsfor the SecondAmendment of the IndianPatentAct,
SYNTHESIS/REGENERATION, Winter 2003, http://www.greens.org/s-r/30/30-19.html; see also
VANDANA SHIVA, BIoPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 81 (1997) (noting
that TRIPS was conceived and shaped by coalitions of U.S., Japanese and European
corporations); George Monbiot, Human Traffic (Oct. 28, 1999), http://www.monbiot.con
archives/1999/10/28/human-traffic/; Primal Seeds.org, Patents, http://www.primalseeds.org/
patents.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2007). Although the exact words may be apocryphal, the
statement captures the dynamic of the TRIPS negotiation. It is undisputed that it was an
industry-led process. The IPC consisted of a small group of self-appointed executives from
Western pharmaceutical, entertainment, and software multinationals. Together, they designed
and sold the TRIPS agreement with the interests of their high-tech industries in mind. SUSAN

K.

SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLic LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS (2003); MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 91-121 (1998).
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environment, the TRIPS negotiation forced developing countries to sign on
to higher standards of intellectual property than their state of development
would otherwise have dictated.' These intellectual property standards are
having profound effects.
Many scholars have commented on these marked asymmetries in the
development of intellectual property norms and principles captured by the
TRIPS agreement. 4 Nowhere is that asymmetry as sharply delineated as it
is in the treatment of the claims of indigenous peoples to a property interest
in their traditional knowledge and biological resources. This asymmetry
stems in large part from one of the most significant changes in intellectual
property rights through TRIPS - the expansion of the kinds of things that
will be patentable.
In particular, TRIPS Article 27, entitled "Patentable Subject Matter,"
requires marked changes to the domestic patent law of many states. Under
Article 27.1, states must ensure that patents "shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
'
The most controversial portion of the TRIPS
industrial application."42
agreement, at least from the indigenous rights perspective, has been Article
27.3's requirement that states include plants and animals within the
inventions eligible for patenting (or develop a sui generis plan for protecting
these inventions).
Arguably there is room within the TRIPS agreement to reshape
implementation in a manner that protects traditional knowledge.4 3 Article 7
identifies the objectives of the entire TRIPS agreement as to "contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination
of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of

40. See, e.g., Symposium, The Boundariesof the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Jose
M. Salazar-Xirinachs, The Trade-LaborNexus: Developing Countries'Perspectives, 3 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 377, 381 (2000) (discussing reasons for Latin American and Caribbean countries'
opposition to linking trade and labor issues in trade negotiations and agreements).
41. See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PoLIcY OPTIONS 5-6 (2000); Paul J.
Heald, Mowing the PlayingField: Addressing Information Distortion and Asymmetry in the
TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REv. 249 (2003); Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of
the WTO Reconsideringthe TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 819, 888 (2003).
42. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 27.1.
43. See Margaret Chon, IntellectualPropertyand the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2821 (2006) (arguing that TRIPS can be read to incorporate substantive equality
norms).
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technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.'" This language, together
with Article 8, which provides that member states may adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and to promote the public interest in
"sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development," 45 was included in the final TRIPS agreement at the behest of
developing countries. These provisions have become something of a rallying
cry for groups attempting to blunt the force of Article 27.3.46
Recently, there has been some modest success in this campaign. In
Paragraph 19 of the Doha Round Ministerial Declaration, for example,
negotiators reaffirmed that Article 27.3(b) needs to be reconsidered in light
of the Article 7 and 8 objectives, with regard to traditional knowledge.4 7 The
Declaration emphasized that this is to be accomplished in the context of
protecting the rights of developing states and the environment, with reference
to CBD. 48 Nonetheless, the focus to date has been predominantly on
protecting producers by expanding protections rather than on balancing
interests.
According to the WTO, "[i]ntellectual property rights are the rights given
to people over the creations of their minds."''9 Yet the way TRIPS is
structured, it is difficult, if not impossible, for indigenous groups to claim any
intellectual property rights over the unmediated products of their traditional
knowledge. As a result, indigenous and traditional knowledge is consigned
to the global commons. This produces a striking imbalance - the "creations

44. TRIPS, supranote 8, art. 7.
45. Id. art. 8.
46. For example, the argument for compulsory licensing of AIDS drugs relied heavily on
Article 8. See, e.g., WTO, Council for TRIPS, Submission by the African Group, Barbados,
Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras,India,Indonesia, Jamaica,
Pakistan,Paraguay,Philippines,Peru,Sri Lanka, Thailandand Venezuela, 22, IP/C/W/296
(June 29,2001), availableat: http://commerce.nic.in/wtosub/fRIPS/subTrips-ipcw296.htm.;
Uchd Ewelukwa, Patent Wars In The Valley Of The Shadow Of Death: The Pharmaceutical
Industry,Ethics, And Global Trade, 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 203, 277-78 (2005).
47. World Trade Organization [WTO] Ministerial Conference, MinisterialDeclarationof
14 November 2001, 19, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/l, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002); see also Haochen Sun,
A Wider Access to PatentedDrugs Under the TRIPSAgreement, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 101, 104
(2003) (hailing the Doha Declaration as a turning point "for legal and political relations at the
WTO"). The ramifications of this Declaration's language remains to be seen.
48. Sun, supranote 47, at 104-05. For a discussion ofwhy the CBD alone does not protect
indigenous peoples, see infra Part II(B).
49. TRIPS Material on the WTO Website, Intellectual Property Rights and the TRIPS
Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/tripse.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
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of the mind" of modem science are considered property and eligible for the
full panoply of TRIPS protections, while the "creations of the mind" of
indigenous peoples are not.
When goods and services are made possible by combining traditional
knowledge with western science, the contributor of the western scientific
thinking is entitled to patent protection - a recognition of his or her property
interest in creations of the mind - under TRIPS, the contributor of traditional
knowledge is entitled to nothing. At its worst, TRIPS legitimizes the transfer
of exclusive ownership and control of biological resources and traditional
knowledge from indigenous innovators to western ones, with no recognition,
reward or protection for the contributions of the indigenous innovators.5"
50. Unfortunately there are many examples of this, such as Neem, Ayahuasca, and rosy
periwinkle. For centuries the products of the Neem tree have been employed in India for a
myriad of uses: insect repellent, fungicide, Ayurvedic medicine toiletries and cosmetics.
Nevertheless, in 1994, the European Patent office granted USDA and W.R. Grace patent
number 436257 for use of a neem extract as a fungicide. After a decade-long court battle,
opponents of the patent ultimately succeeded in having the patent invalidated on the ground of
prior public use. See India Hails EPO Ruling Against Patent Relating to Traditional
Knowledge, 14 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 10 (Apr. 2005), availableat http://pubs.bna.
com/ip/BNA/wipr.nsf/is/aObOq7m3dO (subscription only) (on file with author); Press Release,
European Patent Office, "Neem Tree Oil" Case: European Patent No. 0436 257 Revoked (May
10, 2000), availableat http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/pressrel/ 2000_05 11 e
.htm. For a discussion ofthis litigation, see, e.g., LINDA BULLARD, RESEARCH FOUND. FOR SCI.,
TECH. & ECOLOGY, FREEING THE FREE TREE: A BRIEFING PAPER ON THE FIRST LEGAL DEFEAT
OF A BIOPIRACY PATENT: THE NEEM CASE (2005), available at http://www.ifoam.org/press/
press/pdfs/BriefingNeem.pdf; ANJA VON HAHN ET AL., INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 73-76 (Silke von Lewinski ed., 2004). Ayahuasca (Banisteriopsis
caapi) is a sacred plant for the Amazon Quichia people, who use it for medicinal and ritual
purposes. In 1986, Loren Miller, a United States scientist who had done research in Ecuador,
was granted U.S. patent No. 5751 on Ayahuasca under the name "Da Vine." After a concerted
effort by the Coordinating Body of the Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin
(COICA), which represented mor than 400 Amazon tribes, and the Centre for International
Environmental Law (CIEL), the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) re-examined and
revoked the patent in 1999 on ground of lack of novelty. However in 2001, six days after the
Bush Administration took office, the USPTO reversed itself and restored the patent. USPTO,
Notice of Intent to Issue Reexamination Certificate: Statement of Reasons for Patentability or
Confirmation (Jan. 26, 2001), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/PTOExaminer_
Transcript.pdf; see Leanne M. Fecteau, The Ayahuasca PatentRevocation: Raising Questions
About Current US.Patent Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69, 69-70, 84 (2001). The
Ayahuasca patent expired in 2003. For a discussion of the rosy periwinkle see James 0. Odek,
Bio-Piracy:CreatingProprietaryRights inPlant Genetic Resources, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 141,
143,147 (1994); Shayana Kadidal, Plants,Poverty,andPharmaceuticalPatents, 103 YALE L.J.
223,223 (1993). For athorough exploration of the issue ofbiopiracy and bioprospecting in the
context of Africa, see Debbie Collier, Access to and Controlover Plant GeneticResourcesfor
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Thus, in the definitional moment itself, TRIPS excludes indigenous
innovation about biological diversity from what will be property in this new
globalized legal world. This treatment stands as a sharp contrast to the patent
rights that biotechnology routinely generates, and that TRIPS requires be
recognized. By defining property to exclude the resources of indigenous
peoples while including what is developed from those resources, this vision
of property reconstructs the cycle of dependency that was at the heart of
colonialism.
TRIPS has to date proven itself resistant to accommodating and protecting
indigenous works within the hyper-owned world it has created. While the
Doha Declaration recognized this problem of inequitable recognition of
property rights, the Minister's state-based perspective suggests that the
fundamental problem of inequity with regard to indigenous rights is unlikely
to be resolved in the near future.
B. State Ownership of Resources Under the Convention on Biological
Diversity
In contrast to TRIPS, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) vests
ownership of biological resources in nation-states. Article 80) of the CBD is
the operative provision for purposes of considering indigenous knowledge. 5
This provision frames traditional knowledge and biological resources through
the lens of state sovereignty, and vests ownership of these resources in the
state 52 (thus treating traditional knowledge much like a tangible resource akin

Foodand Agriculture in South and Southern Africa: How Many Wrongs Before a Right?, 7
MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 529 (2006). But see MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OwNs NATIVE
CULTURE? 136-38 (2003); Jim Chen, There's No Such Thing as Biopiracy. . . andIt's a Good
Thing Too, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2006). In pointing out the great disparity in treatment of
intellectual contributions in these instances, this essay is not meant to suggest that these cases
are easy or that recognition of traditional knowledge would not be challenging. Indeed, it would
require a rethinking of what will be considered property - exactly what this essay proposes.
51. The CBD provides in relevant part:
Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: .... j) Subject
to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations
and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional
lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity
and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the
holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations
and practices.
CBD, supra note 5, art. 80).
52. Id. art. 3; see also International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
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to oil or uranium). Along with Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration, 53 the CBD
looks at the protection of traditional knowledge as an essential component of
the broader concern for global ecological sustainability.
This perspective was hailed by many as a victory for developing states and
for the environment. Activists have sought to use it as leverage in their
opposition to the TRIPS 27.3(b) requirement that states recognize patent
rights in plants and genetic resources. Vandana Shiva, for example, argues
that the CBD permits protection of traditional knowledge as the "common
property of the people of India, and as a national heritage" despite any
provisions of TRIPS to the contrary.'
Even if activists are successful in staking out room for states to maneuver
around the TRIPS patenting requirement, that victory alone will not satisfy
the aspirations of indigenous peoples to have control over their resources and
knowledge. Neither Article 8(j) nor anything else in the CBD recognizes or
vests any rights in indigenous peoples. The Conference of Parties has taken
steps to remedy this deficiency by creating an ad hoc working group to
develop guidelines on access and benefit-sharing. In 2001, the working group
proposed "Draft Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair
and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization."" This
draft mentions the rights of indigenous communities to their traditional
knowledge and calls for prior informed consent as well as benefit-sharing.56
However, the Guidelines are only recommendations for voluntary state action,

Agriculture, art. 10, openedforsignatureNov.3,2001 (enteredintoforce June2004), available
at ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/ITPGRe.pdf (characterizing these resources as "sovereign national
property" though the treaty also commits states to the principle of equitable benefit sharing).
53. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992,
Rio Declarationon EnvironmentandDevelopment,princ. 22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/6/Rev. 1
(June 14, 1992), 31 I.L.M. 874. Principle 22 provides:
Indigenous people and their communities, and other local communities, have a
vital role in environmental management and development because of their
knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognize and duly support
their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in the
achievement of sustainable development.
Id.
54. Vandana Shiva, Biopiracy: Need to Change Western IPR Systems (Dec. 22, 1999),
http://www.sedos.org/english/shiva.htm. This is an argument she has made frequently
55. Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Hague, Apr. 8-19,
2002, Report of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access andBenefit-Sharing, 14,
U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/6 (Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/
meetings/cop/cop-06/official/cop-06-06-en.pdf.
56. Id.at 20, 29.
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not mandatory requirements. 7 Thus, the Guidelines are vastly different than
the requirements imposed by TRIPS. Even if these Guidelines were
mandatory, it is not clear how much effect they would have. Where TRIPS
is backed by the power of the WTO Dispute Resolution process, the CBD
enforcement measures are quite weak. That makes it unlikely that a CBD
ruling would be enforced at the expense of interests protected by TRIPS.58
Moreover, vesting ownership and control of traditional knowledge in states
can be extremely problematic. Westphalia aside, states often cannot be
trusted to protect the interests of their citizens, particularly the interests of
minority groups. 59 This phenomenon is of even more concern when the
interests of historically oppressed minority groups, like most indigenous
peoples, conflict with the perceived interests of the majority culture. This is
a situation in which indigenous groups often find themselves. While state
ownership can give states the needed leverage to protect traditional
knowledge,6" state ownership can also hasten the dispossession of indigenous
groups as states clamor for foreign investment.6
Another more subtle risk is state pressure in the form of investments (often
in conjunction with foreign partners) designed to transform indigenous
cultures into a marketable commodity. With the growth of eco-tourism and
cultural tours, commodification of indigenous culture has become a big
57. Id. at 14, 4.
58. Another major roadblock to the success of the Biodiversity Convention more generally
is the failure of the United States to ratify it. Since its inception, the United States has been
critical of the Biodiversity Convention, largely on this very ground--that it would impair
American intellectual property rights.
59. See Rosemary Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New
Dilemmas in InternationalLaw Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the
ConservationofBiodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 59 (1998).
60. For example, members of the Andean Community have adopted a Common Regime
on Access to Genetic Resources, and a Common Intellectual Property regime. These regimes
lay out conditions for access to genetic resources, their by-products, and associated knowledge.
Read together, these regimes enabled Andean Community to create a property regime that
requires the consent of indigenous communities and a plan for equitable profit sharing before
any patent can be claimed for a product derived from genetic resources or traditional
knowledge. Andean Community/Decision 391: Common Regime on Access to Genetic
Resources (July 2, 1996), http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/d391e.htm;
Andean Community: Decision 486 (Sept. 14,2000), http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/
normativa/d486e.htm. Similarly, Costa Rica's Biodiversity Law mentions indigenous peoples
in the context of access to genetic resources. However, in both cases, implementation has been
the big challenge.
61. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, at 232 (Aug. 31, 2001).
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business. Only rarely do the indigenous groups in question have 6control
of
2
theft.
"cultural
about
allegations
and
concerns
raising
this process,
III. TraditionalKnowledge andPatent Protection
In the context of traditional knowledge, the state-ownership regime
envisioned by the CBD collides head on with the private ownership model
embedded in TRIPS. Given the sovereignty aspirations of indigenous
peoples, 6 3 this collision might be an opportunity to rethink the meaning of
property systems.
The basic problem is that the intellectual property principles embedded in
TRIPS were largely developed to meet the needs of a capitalist market
economy. As a result, the very terminology of western intellectual property
law is largely antithetical to indigenous forms of ownership that tend to center
on collective, inter-generational production from community-based
economies.'
So too, the basic concepts that undergird the intellectual
property system: exclusive ownership, alienability, and monopoly rights do
not translate across this divide. Traditional knowledge does not fit into these
categories because it is rooted in communal development of knowledge rather
than in individual innovation. While many have argued that from a human
rights perspective, the right to property is not only an individual right of
possession (a civil right), but is also a collective social, economic, and

62. See Rosemary T. Coombe, The Propertiesof Culture and the Politics ofPossessing
Identity: Native Claims in the CulturalAppropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIs. 249
(1993) (detailing accusations that the unauthorized use of native histories by non-indigenous
authors amounts to "the theft of voice"). In the United States, for example, the names of native
American tribes and historical leaders have been used to sell every type of consumer product from automobiles to alcoholic beverages.
63. A full description of these aspirations is beyond the scope of this essay. Interested
readers should see ANAYA, supra note 9.
64. See, e.g., World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Intergovernmental Comm. on
Intellectual Prop. & Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and FoIldore, The Protection
ofTraditionalKnowledge:Revised Objectives andPrinciples,Annex 11, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5
(Jan. 9, 2006) (asserting that "[p]rotection of traditional knowledge should respond to the
collective or communal context and inter-generational character of its development,
preservation and transmission, its relationship to a community's cultural and social identity and
integrity, beliefs, spirituality and values, and constantly evolving character within the
community") [hereinafter WIPO, Revised Objectives].
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cultural right,65 such arguments have not had much impact in the intellectual
property context.
Although the particular challenges of protecting traditional knowledge
within a globalizing intellectual property system may be sui generis, this is
not the first iteration of this conflict. Indeed, many view implementation of
TRIPS as nothing more than the newest sub-chapter in the on-going saga of
dispossessing indigenous peoples from their lands and their resources. While
such a view may be understandable, it actually understates the problem.
TRIPS works yet another wrong because it is not only a continuation of
historical disregard for indigenous land rights, it is an entirely new form of
dispossession - this time of knowledge itself.
Protecting traditional knowledge will therefore involve more than bringing
a new form of knowledge within the scope of intellectual property law. If that
was all that was at stake, this problem would be fairly easy to resolve; new
areas become subject to patent protection all the time. For example,
intellectual property law has recently expanded to include living organisms,66
and various financial instruments," within the scope of patentable subject
matters. Indeed, the definition of intellectual property in the WIPO
Convention itself casts a broad net and specifically includes language
designed to extend protection beyond the listed categories of intellectual
property, to all the fruits of "intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific,
literary or artistic fields."6' This definition would certainly be broad enough
to permit the formal recognition of traditional knowledge under the rubric of
"intellectual property."
However, in order for property laws to truly protect traditional knowledge
and the interests of indigenous peoples, the international community (and
each national community) must engage in a fundamental rethinking of what

65. For example, in the Awas-Tigni case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
accepted that the international human right to property embraces the communal property
regimes of indigenous peoples as defined by their own customs and traditions. Mayagna
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79
(judgement on merits and reparations); see also James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples'
ParticipatoryRights in Relation to Decisions About NaturalResource Extraction: The More
FundamentalIssue of What Rights Indigenous PeoplesHave in Land andResources, 22 ARIZ.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 13 (2004).

66.
67.
& FIN.
68.

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
See Paul E. Schaafsma, A GatheringStorm in the FinancialIndustry, 9 STAN. J.L. Bus.
176 (2004) (discussing financial instrument patents).
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, art. 2(viii), July

14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1770, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
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constitutes property. This rethinking must include the recognition of
collective rights and rights that can be extended to communities rather than
individuals or states. This is no small task. Even the attempt to conceptualize
such rights is difficult, colliding as it does with the individual/state dichotomy
that is the dominant paradigm of the Westphalian system.
Because this paradigm does not fit with most indigenous groups' own
conception of their rights regarding their cultural knowledge, it is hard to
imagine how it might be adapted to meet their needs. Indigenous groups thus
face an unpalatable choice: either remake their traditional knowledge in the
image of the rights claimed and recognized within the dominant society69 and
break down the essence of their traditional culture into distinct sticks of
property, or deny themselves access to existing intellectual property
protections. The Thammasat Resolution recognized this reality, and drawing
on the wording of TRIPS Article 27.3 sought to carve out a new space for
indigenous peoples - recognition of the sui generis nature of traditional
knowledge.7 °
IV. Some Striking HistoricalParallels
The international dialogue about TRIPS, CBD and traditional knowledge
is in many ways a replay of earlier discussions about indigenous property
rights in the context of colonialism. The root problem is definitional: what
exactly is considered property for purposes of these legal regimes? TRIPS
seems to have revived a modern version of the Las Casa - Sepulvida 1550
debate that had tremendous repercussions for whether or not the peoples of
the New World would be treated as owning their land.7 These debates arose
because the land claims that stemmed from the so-called "Age of
Exploration" had a fatal flaw: the "newly-discovered" lands were already
inhabited. Thus, a central question arose, who owned these lands, the
69. See, e.g., Barsh, supra note 6 (discussing this dilemma and decrying it as "cognitive
imperialism").
70. Thamrasat Resolution, supra note 10.
71. For an in-depth discussion on the Valladolid Debate of 1550 between Las Casas and
Sepulveda, including a discussion of Vitoria's and Las Casas' position, see LEWIS HANKE, THE
SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA

(2002). Although the central

questions of the debate were whether the occupants of the newly discovered lands were
endowed with souls and the legitimacy of waging war against the Indians, a clear corollary to
these issues was the question of whether the Indians had property rights that Spanish colonists
had to respect. Where Sepulveda argued that the natives of the New World were not human,
and therefore possessed no rights, de Las Casas made the case that they were endowed with the
same natural rights that all humans possess. Id.

AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 3 1

European "discoverers" or the native inhabitants? In the rush to issue
biotechnology patents over the past few decades, and in the expansive
interpretations the United States and other Western courts have given these
patents, and most particularly in the TRIPS agreement effort to enshrine these
standards globally, there is a very real danger of recreating the Discovery
Doctrine with a "new world" of genetic resources and other forms of
traditional knowledge.
During the "Age of Discovery" the property question was whether the
kinds of uses to which the "native peoples" put their land amounted to
ownership or to a property right. Conveniently enough for "the discoverers"
the answer was almost always no. Perhaps most famously, in Johnson v.
M'Intosh,72 the United States Supreme Court proclaimed that the Painkashaw
Indians were deemed to be mere inhabitants rather than owners of their land.73
Indeed, according to property theories recognized at the time, Justice
Marshall concluded that the various Indian nations had no ownership rights
to land either individually, collectively, or as a nation, but instead held a right
of mere occupancy.74 This rather startling conclusion rested on the belief that
the tribes did not occupy their lands in a fashion that prevented its
appropriation by farmers for agriculture. 75 He asserted that "[a]ll the
proprietary rights of civilized nations on this continent are founded on this
principle." 76 Any other result, Justice Marshall wrote, would be "to leave the
country a wilderness."7 7 After Johnson v. M'Intosh, it was settled law in the
United States that Indian nations and individuals did not have claim to the
kind of property interests in their lands that European settlers routinely
expected to have in theirs. According to Justice Marshall, the difference was
attributable to the differing uses to which the two groups put their land."
However, since farming Indian communities fared no better than huntergatherers, it seems likely that the portion of Marshall's decision discussing
racial and religious absolutes was more the true reason. In Australia, this
point was carried to its extreme with the doctrine of terra nullius, which
recognized no aboriginal rights to land.

72. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823).

73. Id. at 591.
74. Id. at 588.
75. Id. at 590-92.
76. Id. at 570.

77. Id. at 590.

78. Id.
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This same vision of what kinds of activities count as productive use and are
thus entitled to legal protection, as opposed to those that are characterized as
merely an aspect of "the natural," is repeated today in the TRIPS discussions
of what qualifies as "an inventive step" for purposes of intellectual property
protection. There is an unpleasant dichotomy between defining the products
of laboratory research as intellectual property subject to the full panoply of
protections afforded by TRIPS and formal domestic law, while characterizing
the uses and experimentation of indigenous peoples as "traditional
knowledge" excluded from these protections.7 9 Once again, the uses to which
indigenous peoples put their resources are defined as outside the scope of
legally protected property interests. The property choices embedded in
TRIPS thus mean that international law once again confers and distributes
property rights in a fashion that systematically dispossesses indigenous
people.
Even granting that, unlike the original Discovery Doctrine, TRIPS has no
invidious intent to specifically dispossess indigenous peoples, the TRIPS
Agreement's insistence that patent rights be recognized, with the prerequisites
of novelty and individual authorship, excludes indigenous peoples from the
intellectual property rights system80 much like the way those same groups
were systematically denied property rights to their land during the periods of
discovery and colonialism." As such, the TRIPS definitions of what is and
is not property for purposes of intellectual property protection raises the
question of whether the Agreement is merely repackaging the discredited
Discovery Doctrine in new garb.
Many argue that the central problems that indigenous groups face are
rooted in a lack of economic and political power, rather than in a lack of
intellectual property rights in their heritage.8 2 According to this view,
79. Russel Barsh has made the argument that the term traditional knowledge is part of the
problem, implying as it does something static and antique that has been handed down through

time without critical evaluation. He argues that "[w]hat the international community needs to
protect is 'indigenous scie7 -,,e."'WORLD INTELLECTUALPROP.

ORG.,

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS: WIPO REPORT ON FACTFINDING MISSIONS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 116, 130 n.3

(2001); see also Vandana Shiva, The Politics of Knowledge at the CBD, http://www.twnside.
org.sg/title/cbd-cn.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
80. See, e.g., ECOSOC, Study on the Protectionof the Culturaland Intellectual Property
ofIndigenousPeoples,supra note 22, 32 (recognizing that patents on cultural and intellectual
property "are not only inadequate for the protection of indigenous peoples' heritage but
inherently unsuitable").

81. Id.
82. See Michael H. Davis, Some Realism About lndigenism, 11 CARDOZOJ.INT'L&COMP.
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intellectual property is about exploiting knowledge for profit and facilitating
innovation. Thus, resorting to intellectual property rules to protect and
preserve indigenous knowledge is a mistake. 83 While economic and political
disadvantages certainly compound the plight of indigenous peoples, to make
this argument is to ignore the insidious and pervasive effect of property
regimes drawn to exclude the resources and wealth of indigenous peoples and
to miss the centrality of the definitional moment to the entire intellectual
property endeavor (what is or is not property).
It is this latter decision, that biodiversity and traditional knowledge form
part of the public domain, that requires exploration. Much as the Discovery
Doctrine depended on the conclusion that indigenous peoples did not "own"
their lands in a fashion that conveyed a property right under western law, so
too the exploitation of biodiversity requires the determination that the
biodiversity itself, as well as traditional knowledge about that biodiversity,
are a commons open to all. Only when this knowledge is part of the vast
public domain from which "inventors" can draw, will it be possible to create
"owned" products by exploiting that knowledge. That the resources of the
indigenous peoples are public domain is a necessary prerequisite to the
success of the regime for western inventors. In short, in order to benefit from
intellectual property schemes, "inventors" have a real interest in ensuring that
traditional knowledge remains part of that public domain. Once again,
powerful forces seeking property rights have construed existing indigenous
uses not to convey any ownership interest in property that is of interest to
outsiders.
After all, knowledge is generally not considered property and its nonproprietary characteristics serve as an important social function facilitating
the advancement of knowledge, technology and the standard of living in
society. Intellectual property rights are an exception to this general rule. The
state creates and enforces intangible rights that would not otherwise exist. By
requiring that states grant patents (or sui generis protections) to the products
of agricultural biotechnology, for example, while leaving the traditional land
races 4 from which biotech products are developed in the public domain,
TRIPS makes very specific choices between what is ownable as property and
what is not. These choices are premised on an assumption that patents track
a bright line between what has always existed and what is made; between

L. 815,
83.
84.
and are

817 (2003).
Id.
Land races are varieties of crop plants that have been developed over time by farmers,
often well-adapted to local environmental conditions.
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evolution and invention; between the natural and the created.8 5 Under such
a vision, the natural world is a backdrop - a commons from which all are
free to draw.
It is a convenient dichotomy but a totally false one. For example,
agricultural plants produced through biotechnology or through sponsored
selective breeding in a laboratory can be patented. Wild relatives cannot.
But, neither can the land races developed by traditional farmers, even though
those land races are just as much a product of human invention as are the
laboratory generated plants. While the latter are property entitled to a full
panoply of protections, the former are considered part of the global commons
from which the latter may be derived.
Far from natural, those land races and traditional medicines are the work
of countless nameless farmers and indigenous healers whose labor and
ingenuity developed these products to maximize certain traits and minimize
others. In fact, they are products of the very same selective breeding that in
the laboratory setting gives rise to a patentable property right. Yet, under
intellectual property law, as it has been globalized through TRIPS, the very
fact that these works were produced by countless, nameless farmers,
gatherers and healers means that they have not, and indeed cannot, give rise
to any property rights. Instead, their work product is treated as a global
commons, the common heritage of humanity.
V. Some FinalThoughts
One dramatic effect of colonization was the conversion of the biological
and natural resources of the colony into wealth for the colonizer. Colonizers
created a legal system designed to ensure their access, on favorable terms, to
prized resources, such as fish, fur, spices, rubber, and silk. Like the
intellectual property rights protected under TRIPS, this earlier, historical
colonization was also built on the fiction of res nullius - the unowned thing.
Now that newly developed technologies enable more pervasive and profitable
exploitation of biological and genetic diversity, we again see a careful
crafting of res nullius that advantages newcomers to the resource at the
expense of traditional users.
Only when the contours of property have been drawn to exclude
traditionally farmed crops, and traditional medicines as unownable, can these

85. See Barsh, supranote 6, at 18 (discussing the tendency of Roman and Western societies
to define other nations as outside the domain of culture and explaining that "[a]s part of nature,
the lands of other societies could be appropriated without moral or legal scruple").
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resources serve as the fodder for patentable innovations. The inputs needed
for biotechnology innovation - the germplasm of existing plants, and the
traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples - must be an unowned
commons in order for the experimentation that underlies the advances of
biotechnology to be permissible and capable of generating lucrative patents.
The identities of the dispossessed and the beneficiaries under this regime
only underscore the power dynamic that underlies seemingly "neutral"
designations of what must be considered property under the global trading
system. The same machinery of rationalization that once created palatable
explanations for why aboriginal inhabitants did not "own" their land, now
lumbers into action to explain why traditional knowledge and land races are
not ownable, while hybrids, or lab distillations of their salient traits are.
Despite much formalism that obscures the contingent nature of property,
the standards for what will be deemed property, and thus entitled to muster
the full powers of the state to its defense, do not exist a priori. Instead, these
standards are created. They exist only in dialogue with a social and political
dynamic, and an underlying value structure. As such, they can be
reconsidered when necessary. This essay suggests it is necessary.
It should never be forgotten that during colonial periods these same
property lines were drawn within a racial caste vision that systematically
86
devalued claims of the non-white, the non-European and the non-Christian.
Those lines were considered as "obvious" and "natural" as the intellectual
property rights enshrined in TRIPS are claimed to be today. To draw lines
that, once again, a priori exclude those same populations, albeit on more
seemingly neutral grounds than "uncivilized" or "non-Christian," ought to
raise some flags.
Is the TRIPS requirement, that all member states recognize a patent on a
gene that embodies a trait that has been safeguarded for centuries by
traditional farmers or indigenous peoples as the one valid claim of ownership,
really different from Pope Alexander's papal bull allocating possession of
lands not inhabited by Christians between Portugal and Spain in 1493?87 Is
86. This was a pivotal question in the de Las Casas-Sepulveda Valladolid debate. See
HANKE, supranote 71.

87. Two months after Columbus returned from his voyage of discovery, on May 4, 1493,
Pope Alexander VI issued his Papal Bull Inter Caetera. See The Bull Inter Caetera,
http://www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/indig-inter-caetera. html (last visited Jan. 21,2007). This
singular document purported to grant the royal families of Spain all and singular countries in
the Western and Eastern Hemispheres and islands hitherto discovered and to be discovered
"together with all their dominions, cities, camps, places, villages, and all rights, jurisdictions,
and appurtenances" of the same. Id. Read in light of earlier Papal issuances, this Bull divided
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the presumption that compounds used as traditional medicine are natural and
therefore not susceptible to property claims any different from the 19th
Century characterization of Australian aborigines as living in a "state of
nature" and thus incapable of appropriating land as property?"8 What is the
difference between deeming Australia, a land that had been inhabited for
millennia, to be "terrus nullius" and deeming genetic resources that have
been cultivated and used for millennia to be "res nullius?" Vattel's
eighteenth century pronouncement that unsettled habitation (meaning no
farming) cannot be accounted as true and legal possession, and therefore
Europeans might lawfully settle lands of the New World, 9 applies as readily
to traditional medicines and biodiversity as it did centuries ago to the lands
of North America and Australia.
These justifications for colonialism have rightly been rejected as sophistry
designed to conceal policies based on expediency and self-interest. The
linkages between these intellectual property rights and past colonial
expropriation of unused land 9 ° are too clear to be ignored. Explicitly
acknowledging the relationship might reframe the question. It might lead us
to the conclusion that these underlying resources were already owned, and
thus not "res nullius" - the unowned thing. As such, these resources would
no longer be acquirable through labor and no longer susceptible to being
reduced to private property for instrumental social reasons.
Under such circumstances, these biological resources, and the traditional
knowledge of their use would no longer serve as a reservoir in which to dip
freely in search of ownable, patentable products. Conversely, what if the
products created by such drawings from the common reservoir retained their
common characteristic, rather than proprietary property? What if such
advances were considered yet another iteration of information open to
collective access - an addition to the global commons of knowledge?
Depending on how property is defined, these outcomes are entirely possible.
Already there are stirrings in that direction. Seizing on the language of
Article 27.3, and reading it through the lens of Articles 7 and 8, the
Thammasat Declaration avowed in part: "' [s]ui generis' perfectly describes
the world between Spain and Portugal.
88. It took until the latter part of the last century for the idea of terranullius to be officially
renounced. See Mabo v. Queensland 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R. I (Austl.). Similarly, in Western
Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 76-86 (Oct. 16), the International Court of Justice
unanimously rejected the doctrine of terranullius when it concluded that the Western Sahara,
at the time of Spanish 1884 colonization was not terra nullius.
89. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1758).

90. See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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the rights and systems we are struggling to defend - our 'own kind' of rights
and systems. We recognize our sui generis rights to exist independently of
the IPR-based sui generis systems promoted by the TRIPS Agreement."'
Similarly, the World Intellectual Property Organization has been exploring
the potential for a sui generis means of protecting traditional knowledge.92
Two possibilities come to mind: a negative and a positive interpretation.
Under the negative interpretation, traditional knowledge would remain part
of the global commons, but so would works derived from that knowledge.
Or, interpreted positively, the international community could redefine
property so that indigenous knowledge is not categorically excluded.
Volumes have been written advocating some variation of these two
alternatives. Regardless of which path the international community decides
to pursue, now is the time to do it. The mad scramble for riches mined from
biodiversity is just beginning. Claims are being staked daily to ideas,
products and processes. Before this claiming process cements itself into an
established ownership regime there is a window of opportunity, perhaps
already rapidly closing, to define what can be owned in this context and what
activities will amount to ownership. If we do not seize the moment, we may
be like those who, having failed to learn from the past, are condemned to
93

repeat

it.

91. Thanmasat Resolution, supra note 10.
92. WIPO, Revised Objectives, supra note 64, at 40.

93. 1 GEORGE

(1905).
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